Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
FEB 17 1977
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

# Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 76-977

VOLVO OF AMERICA CORPORATION,
*Petitioner,*

vs.

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, Judge,
United States District Court for the
Northern District of California,
*Respondent.*

CHARLENE P. ROSACK, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,
*Real Parties in Interest*

## OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

COTCHETT, HUTCHINSON & DYER,
JOSEPH W. COTCHETT,
Bank of California Building,
El Camino Real at Fourth Avenue,
San Mateo, California 94402,
Telephone: (415) 342-9000,

CARTWRIGHT, SAROYAN, MARTIN & SUCHERMAN, INC.,
JAY R. MARTIN,
RANDALL D. MORRISON,
160 Sansome Street,
San Francisco, California 94104,
Telephone: (415) 433-0440,

BROWN, WRIGHT & KAUFMAN,
HAROLD C. WRIGHT,
2600 El Camino Real,
Palo Alto, California 94306,
Telephone: (415) 328-2390,

*Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest Charlene P. Rosack, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated.*

PERNAU-WALSH PRINTING CO. - 552 MISSION STREET - SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94105

## Subject Index


| | Page |
|---|---|
| Questions Presented | 1 |
| Statutory Provisions Involved | 2 |
| Statement of the Case | 3 |
| Summary of Argument | 8 |
| Reasons for Denying the Writ | 10 |
| I. The Court of Appeals properly denied Defendant's Petition for Writ of Mandamus, where the District Court thoroughly considered the jurisdictional issues, found that the court lacked jurisdiction, and based its remand order expressly on 28 U.S.C. §1447(c) | 10 |
| II. The District Court based its remand order exclusively on grounds authorized by 28 U.S.C. §1447(c), and Defendant's assertions to the contrary are based on patent distortions of the District Court's order | 15 |
| III. This Court in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973) has already determined that a class action cannot be maintained where only some of the class members meet the jurisdictional minimum | 21 |
| Conclusion | 24 |


## Index to Appendix


| | Page |
|---|---|
| 1. List of Briefs on Jurisdictional Issues Filed in District Court in this Action | 1 |
| 2. Reporter's Transcript of Hearing, September 24, 1976 | 2 |
| 3. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Request for Stay of Remand Order | 10 |
| 4. Supplemental Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Remand | 25 |

## Table of Authorities Cited


| Cases | Pages |
|---|---|
| City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972) | 5, 12, 21, 22 |
| Freeman v. Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 398 F.Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) | 23, 24 |
| Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969) | 24 |
| In Re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 535 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1976) | 18, 20 |
| Midland Mortgage Co. v. Winner, 532 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1976) | 18, 19, 21 |
| Robertson v. Ball, 534 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1976) | 18, 19, 20 |
| Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969) reh. den. 394 U.S. 1025, 89 S.Ct. 1622, 23 L.Ed. 50 (1969) | 4 |
| Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976) | 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25 |
| United Pacific/Reliance Ins. Cas. v. Lewiston, 372 F.Supp. 700 (D.Idaho 1974) | 24 |
| Volvo Corporation of America v. Schwarzer, Opinion in Chambers, ..... U.S. ....., 97 S.Ct. 28, 50 L.Ed.2d 273 (1976) | 8 |
| Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973) | 2, 3, 4, 9, 13, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 |

| Rules | |
|---|---|
| Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: | |
| Rule 23 | 5, 15, 16 |

| Statutes | |
|---|---|
| California Business & Professions Code, §16700 et seq. | 3 |
| California Vehicle Code, §285 | 6 |
| United States Code, Title 28: | |
| §1447(c) | 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 21, 25 |
| §1447(d) | 2, 8, 9, 10, 12, 17 |

| Other Authorities | |
|---|---|
| 57 Opinions California Attorney General 561 (1974) | 6 |


IN THE

# Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No.

VOLVO OF AMERICA CORPORATION,
*Petitioner,*

vs.

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, Judge,
United States District Court for the
Northern District of California,
*Respondent.*

CHARLENE P. ROSACK, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
*Real Parties in Interest.*

## OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Real Parties in Interest, Charlene Rosack, et al., respectfully pray that this Court deny Petitioner Volvo of America's request that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered in this proceeding on November 11, 1976.

### QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Did the Court of Appeals properly deny Defendant's Petition for Writ of Mandamus, where the

District Court fully considered the jurisdictional issues, found that there was no jurisdiction, and based its Remand Order expressly upon 28 U.S.C. §1447(c)?

2. Did the Court of Appeals properly deny Defendant's Petition for Writ of Mandamus, where the District Court based its Remand Order exclusively on grounds authorized by 28 U.S.C. §1447(c)?

3. Should Defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari be denied where this Court, in *Zahn v. International Paper Co.*, 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973) has already determined that a class action *cannot* be maintained where only *some* of the class members meet the jurisdictional minimum?

---

**STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED**

28 U.S.C. §1447. **Procedure after removal generally**

" * * *

(c) If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case, and may order the payment of just costs. A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by its clerk to the State court. The court may thereupon proceed with such case.

(d) An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise."



**STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

Plaintiff Charlene Rosack filed this class action in the California State Courts alleging that Petitioner Volvo of America (hereafter "Defendant"), violated the California Cartwright Act[1] through a conspiracy with its dealers to fix prices and require purchasers of Volvo automobiles to buy only Volvo parts and accessories. Defendant petitioned for removal to Federal Court based upon diversity of citizenship and plaintiffs promptly moved for remand based upon absence of the requisite amount in controversy for each member of plaintiff's class.[2]

For the next nine (9) months, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California studied a dozen briefs filed by both sides and heard a half-dozen oral arguments on these jurisdictional issues.[3] The fundamental issue before the District Court was whether attorneys' fees anticipated in a class action could be aggregated and attributed to the named plaintiff to permit jurisdiction, even though the individual class members' claims upon which these fees were based could not be aggregated under the rules established in *Zahn v. International Paper Co.*, 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973).

In the arguments before Honorable Owen E. Woodruff, Jr., United States Magistrate for the Northern

---

[1]California Business & Professions Code, §16700 et seq.

[2]Plaintiff also challenged Defendant's claim of diversity of citizenship, but Plaintiff's position on this issue was not accepted by the District Court and Defendant's subsequent appeals involved solely the amount in controversy issue.

[3]The numerous briefs and their dates are listed in the Appendix hereto.

District of California, Plaintiff argued that no individual purchasers of Volvo automobiles could present claims in excess of $10,000, and that neither these individual claims nor the attorney fees based on them could be aggregated to meet the amount in controversy requirement. There was never any dispute that the class members' claims themselves were "separate and distinct" and could not be aggregated under this Court's rule in *Snyder v. Harris,* 394 U.S. 332, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969) and *Zahn v. International Paper Company,* 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973). Defendant argued, however, that these rules pertaining to aggregation of claims were not relevant at this stage of the proceedings, because:

> "She [Charlene Rosack] is the only party plaintiff in the case at this time. We cannot speculate as to whether she will ever be found to represent a class of Volvo purchasers, or if such class can ever be certified."[4]

Defendant then argued that, since attorney fees could be considered in determining the amount in controversy, all the attorney fees for this suit could be attributed to the named plaintiff alone, thus giving her a claim "in excess of $10,000."[5]

The Magistrate accepted Defendant's argument and in his Order simply stated:

> "There is more than $10,000 in controversy in this litigation. Such a finding is based on the

[4]Defendant's Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Remand, May 27, 1976, p. 3.

[5]*Id.*, at p. 4.



> fact that attorneys fees can be considered in determining whether the requisite amount in controversy is present. (see cases cited in defendants' brief)".[6]

Plaintiff then filed a Notice of Objections To The Magistrate's Findings And Recommendations, and pointed out the Ninth Circuit's rule in *City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles,* 451 F.2d 948 (1972), that an action filed as a class action *must be assumed to be a class action in determining jurisdiction* and until a contrary determination is made after a class certification motion under Rule 23.

After further briefing by both sides, the District Court, by Honorable William W. Schwarzer, held a hearing on September 10, 1976 and indicated that the Court could not accept Defendant's argument for assigning all attorney fees to the named plaintiff to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. Defendant's counsel then suggested a totally new argument never raised in the briefs: Defendant's counsel believed a large number of plaintiffs might, in fact, have claims in excess of $10,000, because plaintiff's Complaint was filed on behalf of all persons "natural or legal" who purchased Volvo automobiles, and would therefore include corporations and other "multiple purchasers" of Volvos. The individual damage claims of these "multiple purchasers" supposedly could exceed $10,000 even though the damage claims per car would only be a few hun-

[6]Magistrate's Findings and Recomendations, Appendix to Defendant's Petition, p. 13.

dred dollars. The Court agreed to continue the hearing to allow Volvo to submit affidavits showing these multiple purchasers and to allow plaintiffs to inspect and counter such affidavits.

On September 24, 1976, Volvo submitted eight (8) Affidavits from a "sample of 20%" of the Volvo dealers in California, and these Affidavits listed twenty-eight (28) "multiple purchasers" who had each allegedly purchased enough Volvo automobiles to accumulate $10,000 in damages. The total number of cars purchased was said to be several hundred.

When Plaintiff examined the Affidavits, however, it became apparent that nearly every one of the twenty-eight "multiple purchasers" was an *automobile leasing company,* which under California law is considered an "automobile dealer" and not a "purchaser at retail" as required by Plaintiff's Complaint.[7] Of the twenty-eight (28) "multiple purchasers", only two (2) turned out to be retail buyers, as required for membership in Plaintiff's class: Between them, they had purchased 22 cars.[8]

---

[7]California Vehicle Code §285; see also 57 Opinions California Attorney General 561 (1974)
Complaint, ¶ III, p. 2:
"Plaintiff, Charlene P. Rosack, brings this action on behalf of herself and all other persons, natural or legal, who purchased a new Volvo automobile at retail from a Volvo dealer located in the State of California during the period in controversy."

[8]See Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Remand, October 7, 1976, included in Appendix hereto.
Defendant subsequently argued that other multiple purchasers might be found because Volvo surveyed only 20% of its dealers. However, all of the dealers in Defendant's affidavits were large dealers in the Los Angeles, San Francisco and San Diego areas. It cannot be seriously expected that surveys of the rural counties would much change the result.



Following arguments on these Affidavits, the Court issued its Order Setting Aside The Magistrate's Findings And Recommendations And Remanding The Action To The State Court. In a subsequent hearing, on October 26, 1976, Judge Schwarzer denied all Defendant's requests for Reconsideration or Vacation of the Order, but granted a stay until October 29, 1976 to allow Defendant to petition for a Writ. During this same hearing, Defendant's counsel questioned the court about its Order and tried to elicit from the court some statement that its remand order was not based upon §1447(c), as stated in the Order, but upon "reasons of judicial economy" and various other grounds suggested by Defendant's counsel.[9] The Court, however, refused to accept the bait and stated that the case had been "improvidently removed" (R.T. 6:23-25), that the Court's Order was "a holding under the statute that the matter does not belong here" (R.T. 7:20-21), and finally:

> "I will state for the record the only reasons for remand are those set forth in the statute. Nothing I say here is to be interpreted by anybody as being a modification, qualification, explanation, or any other kind of comment upon my prior order." (R.T. 8:15-19).

The District Court's Remand Order was to take effect on October 29, 1976, but on October 28, 1976 the Court of Appeals granted Defendant another temporary stay, to allow the Court's full Motions Panel to consider Defendant's Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

---

[9]R.T. 7:5-14; 8:3-12. (Transcript included in Appendix hereto.)

Defendant's Petition set off still another round of briefing on the amount in controversy issue as well as on the propriety of review of the District Court's Order.[10] Following submission of these briefs, the Court of Appeals denied Defendant's Petition, and Defendant then applied to Justice Rehnquist for a Stay of the Remand Order.[11] Justice Rehnquist also denied Defendant's request and explained that, under 28 U.S.C. §1447(d) and this Court's recent decision in *Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,* 423 U.S. 336, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976), the Court of Appeals properly denied Defendant's Petition to review the Remand Order of the District Court.[12]

The issues raised in Defendant's Petition to the Court of Appeals, and in its subsequent application to Justice Rehnquist, are virtually identical to those raised in Defendant's present Petition to this Court for a Writ of Certiorari.

---

**SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

Defendant Volvo of America's Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied because it invites this Court to ignore two of its recent decisions. In *Therm-*

[10]See Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Petition for Writ of Mandamus, included in Appendix hereto.

[11]The Court of Appeals Order is included in the Appendix to Defendant's Petition.

[12]Justice Rehnquist's Opinion In Chambers, On Application of Stay, *Volvo Corporation of America v. Schwarzer* (___ U.S. ___, 97 S.Ct. 28, 50 L.Ed.2d 273 (1976) is also included in the Appendix to Defendant's Petition.



*tron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,* 423 U.S. 336, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976) this Court ruled that 28 U.S.C. §1447(d) prohibits review of remand orders where the District Court based its remand on 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). In the present case, the District Court not only based the remand expressly on §1447 (c), but specifically found that it did not have jurisdiction of the action because, under this Court's rule in *Zahn v. International Paper Co.,* 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973), all but a few class members would have to be dismissed for failure to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.

Since the District Court based its remand order on 28 U.S.C. §1447(c) and fully explained its findings on the jurisdictional issues, there is simply no basis for comparison of the present case with *Thermtron Products, Inc., supra,* where the District Court completely ignored §1447(c). Under this Court's rule in *Thermtron, supra,* the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was completely correct in denying Defendant's Petition for Writ of Mandamus to review the District Court's remand order. Defendant's only remaining contention has also been answered by this Court in *Zahn v. International Paper Co., supra.* Since *Zahn,* there is no question that a Court *cannot* maintain jurisdiction over a class action where only "some" of the class members meet the amount in controversy requirement.

## REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

### I. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, WHERE THE DISTRICT COURT THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES, FOUND THAT THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION, AND BASED ITS REMAND ORDER EXPRESSLY ON 28 U.S.C. §1447(c).

This Court's recent decision in *Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,* 423 U.S. 336, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976) established a limited exception to the general rule in 28 U.S.C. §1447(d), which prohibits review of remand orders based on §1447(c):

> §1447. **Procedure after removal generally**
>
> "(c) If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case, and may order the payment of just costs. A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by its clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such case.
>
> (d) An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise."

In *Thermtron, supra,* this Court held that a Court of Appeals could review by mandamus a remand decision of a District Court *which did not even purport to base its remand order on 28 U.S.C. §1447(c),* but which instead remanded the case because of the



Court's "crowded docket". The Court explained the basis for its decision as follows:

> "Here, respondent *did not purport* to proceed on the basis that this case had been removed 'improvidently and without jurisdiction.' *Neither the propriety of the removal nor the jurisdiction of the court was questioned by respondent in the slightest. Section 1447(c) was not even mentioned.* Instead, the District Court's order was based on grounds wholly different from those upon which § 1447(c) permits remand. The determining factor was the District Court's heavy docket, which respondent thought would unjustly delay plaintiffs in going to trial on the merits of their action. This consideration, however, is plainly irrelevant to whether the District Court would have had jurisdiction of the case had it been filed initially in that court, to the removability of a case from the state court under § 1441 and hence to the question whether this cause was removed 'improvidently and without jurisdiction' within the meaning of the statute." (*Thermtron, supra,* at 423 U.S. 343-344). (emphasis added)

Nowhere in the Court's opinion is there the slightest suggestion that the ruling may be used as an excuse for wholesale review of remand orders which *are* based upon 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). The Court, in fact, emphasized that such was not the case:

> "In so holding we neither disturb nor take issue with the well established general rule that §1447 (d) and its predecessors were intended to forbid review by appeal or extraordinary writ of any order remanding a case on the grounds permitted by the statute." (*Thermtron, supra,* at 423 U.S. 351-352).

Earlier in its opinion, the Court explained in greater detail that §1447(d) remains a complete bar to review of remand orders issued pursuant to §1447(c):

> "It is unquestioned in this case and conceded by petitioners that this section *prohibits review of all remand orders issued pursuant to §1447(c) whether erroneous or not and whether review is sought by appeal or by extraordinary writ.* This has been the established rule under § 1447(d) and its predecessors stretching back to 1887. See, e.g., In re Pennsylvania Co. 137 US 451, 34 L. Ed 738, 11 S Ct 141 (1890), Exparte Matthew Addy S.S. Co. 256 US 417, 65 L Ed 1027, 41 S Ct 508 (1921), Employers Reinsurance Corporation v. Bryant, 299 US 374, 81 L Ed 289, 57 S Ct 273 (1937), United States v. Rice, 327 US 742, 90 L Ed 982, 66 S Ct 835 (1946). *If a trial judge purports to remand a case on the grounds that it was removed 'improvidently and without jurisdiction' his order is not subject to challenge in the Court of Appeals by appeal, by mandamus or otherwise."* (*Thermtron, supra,* at 423 U.S. 343). (Emphasis added.)

In the present case, the District Court not only "purported" to remand the case pursuant to §1447(c), but also thoroughly explained the reasons for its finding that the Court lacked jurisdiction. The Court first noted that the case must be treated as a class action for jurisdictional purposes, citing the Ninth Circuit rule in *City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles,* 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972).[13] The Court

[13]Order Setting Aside Magistrate's Finding and Recommendation and Remanding Action To State Court, Appendix to Defendant's Petition, p. 8.



then examined this Court's definitive ruling in *Zahn v. International Paper Co.,* 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973) and its application to a removed action in the present case.[14] In so doing the Court also explained its evidentiary finding on the amount in controversy issue:

> "Viewing the record on this motion in the light most favorable to defendants, it appears that only a few members of a class estimated to have some 50,000 members meet the jurisdictional requirement." (Order Setting Aside Magistrate's Findings And Recommendation And Remanding Action To State Court, Appendix to Defendant's Petition p. 11)

The Court, finally, noted that this analysis was not altered by the fact that attorney fees could be taken into account in considering the amount in controversy.[15]

All of this discussion preceded the Court's statement of its conclusions:

> *"It thus appears to a legal certainty that this Court does not have jurisdiction of this action. It is a class action brought on behalf of a class of plaintiffs the vast majority of which do not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement with respect to their separate and distinct claims.* Under *Zahn,* all of those plaintiffs would have to be dismissed and, if feasible, a class substantially different from that on whose behalf the action was brought certified. Accordingly, since the action could not be maintained in this Court

[14]*Id.,* pp. 9-10.
[15]*Id.,* p. 11.

on behalf of the class for which it was brought, it must be remanded. 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). See, *Kinsey v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,* 359 F.Supp. 36 (D.N.D. 1973). (Order, *supra,* Appendix to Petition, p. 12) (Emphasis added.)

The court's Order thus fully reflects the months of consideration the court devoted to the jurisdictional issues before ordering remand pursuant to §1447(c). It is simply fatuous for Defendant to represent to this Court that Judge Schwarzer's decision compares in any way with the District Court's in *Thermtron,* or that Judge Schwarzer's Order was a mere, wooden "invocation" of §1447(c) designed to cover up a decision based on other grounds.

Justice Rehnquist has, in fact, rejected this very same argument made by Defendant in its application for a stay of the Remand Order. Justice Rehnquist stated:

"We held last Term in *Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,* 423 U. S. 336 (1976), where the District Court ordered a remand because of its crowded docket, that § 1447(d) did not bar review of remand orders 'issued on grounds not authorized by § 1447c,' *id.,* at 343. But the District Court here *did* base its order on § 1447(c). *Thermtron* is of no help to applicant as the remand was explicitly based on an allegedly erroneous finding that the court 'does not have jurisdiction of this action,' see 423 U. S., at 343-344. Applicant's position would mean that any allegedly erroneous application of § 1447 (c) would be reviewable by Writ of Mandamus, leaving the § 1447 (d) bar extant only in the case of



allegedly proper application of § 1447 (c); a reading too Pickwickian to be accepted, and contrary to the clear language of *Thermtron."* (On Application of Stay, Appendix to Defendants' Petition, p. 3) (Emphasis in original)

---

**II. THE DISTRICT COURT BASED ITS REMAND ORDER EXCLUSIVELY ON GROUNDS AUTHORIZED BY 28 U.S.C. §1447(c) AND DEFENDANT'S ASSERTIONS TO THE CONTRARY ARE BASED ON PATENT DISTORTIONS OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER.**

Defendant's Petition to this Court is a compound of several serious misstatements. The most fundamental misstatement is Defendant's assertion that Judge Schwarzer relied on grounds "outside" §1447(c) in rendering his decision. Defendant asserts:

"In the present case, the District Court based its remand order on considerations relating to the maintenance of a class action. The District Court thus allowed Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to defeat properly attached federal jurisdiction."
(Petition, p. 9)

Nowhere in Judge Schwarzer's opinion does he purport to base remand upon procedural considerations relating to Rule 23, and Defendant's misrepresentations that he did so are based entirely on quotation out of context. In presenting its conclusions, the Court actually stated:

"It thus appears to a legal certainty that this Court does not have jurisdiction of this action. It is a class action brought on behalf of a class of

plaintiffs the vast majority of which do not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement with respect to their separate and distinct claims. Under *Zahn,* all of those plaintiffs would have to be dismissed and, if feasible, a class substantially different from that on whose behalf the action was brought certified. *Accordingly, since the action could not be maintained in this Court on behalf of the class for which it was brought, it must be remanded."* 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c). See, *Kinsey v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,* 359 F.Supp. 36 (D.N.D. 1973).

(Order, supra, Appendix to Defendants' Petition, pp. 11-12) (Emphasis added.)

In Defendant's argument to this Court, Defendant simply omits the first two sentences above and fastens upon the language, ". . . since the action could not be maintained in this Court on behalf of the class for which it was brought . . . ," to suggest that the Court was relying on unspecified procedural considerations pertaining to *maintenance of class actions* under Rule 23. Every bit of the Court's Order, however, shows that remand was based entirely on the finding that all but a few class members could not meet the jurisdictional minimum and would have to be dismissed under this Court's rule in *Zahn.*

Defendant's second, important misrepresentation is the number of class plaintiffs who do meet the jurisdictional requirement of $10,000.00. In its Order, the District Court found that "only *a few* members of a class estimated to have some 50,000 members meet the jurisdictional requirements." According to defend-



ant's Petition, however, the District Court found jurisdiction over "several" plaintiffs (Petition, p. 8) and by the end of the Petition, this Court is asked to consider whether a District Court can properly remand a class action "where *some, but not all,* members of the class meet the federal jurisdictional requirements." (Petition, p. 12) These misstatements might ordinarily be excused as minor exaggerations, but in this case they are the very foundation of Defendant's argument and have been used repeatedly for nine months to delay Plaintiff's case and to massively increase her costs of litigation.

Finally, it should be noted that Defendant has also misrepresented Justice Rehnquist's opinion denying Defendant's application for a stay. Justice Rehnquist did *not* suggest that a remand order like the one in *Therntron* could be saved by the simple expedient of adding the citation "28 USC 1447 (c)" to the Court's findings. What Justice Rehnquist *did* say is that §1447(d) bars review of remand orders issued pursuant to §1447(c), *whether the orders are erroneous or not.*[16] Ever since the Petition to the Court of Appeals, Defendant has consistently tried to ignore this point by arguing, in effect, that anytime a court issues a remand order which Defendant thinks "is wrong", under the statute, the remand order must have been based on grounds "outside of" or "not authorized by" the statute.

Defendant is also incorrect in stating that, if certiorari is denied in this case, Justice Rehnquist's opin-

[16]On Application of Stay, Appendix to Defendant's Petition, p. 3, Note 3.

ion "will stand as the only interpretation of the scope of the *Thermtron* ruling." (Petition, p. 8). Several decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeal have already interpreted *Thermtron*—and all of them prior to Defendant's Petition for a Writ here. *(Midland Mortgage Co. v. Winner,* 532 F.2d 1342; (10th Cir. April 6, 1976); *Robertson v. Ball,* 534 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. June 23, 1976); *In Re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,* 535 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. August 3, 1976))

For example, in *Midland Mortgage Co. v. Winner, supra,* the District judge concluded that the case had been improperly removed because three of plaintiff's five causes of action were dependent on the fourth cause of action, which was alleged against several Colorado defendants who, according to the District judge, "had no right to remove from Colorado state court." *(Midland Mortgage Co., supra,* at 1343). The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Mandamus, stating:

> *We are convinced that the Court was clearly remanding the suit on grounds specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), namely that under the removal statutes the case "was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction," as the removal statute says.* This being so, the order of remand "is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (d). While a *narrow exception* for review on mandamus was recently recognized in *Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,* 423 U.S. 336, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542, 44 USLW 4085, *that opinion makes it clear to us that we have no jurisdiction to review the order of remand in this mandamus proceeding. We feel the Court's reasoning is clear,* 423 U.S. at 351, 96 S.Ct. at 593, 46 L.Ed.2d at 554, 44 USLW at 4090:
>
> *(Midland Mortgage Co., supra,* at p. 1344). [emphasis added].



After quoting extensively from *Thermtron,* the Court in *Midland Mortgage Co., supra,* went on to say:

> "We have no case like *Thermtron* where the District Court remanded because of the crowded condition of its civil docket, a ground not provided for remand in § 1447(c). *Without reaching or deciding whether remand was proper, in the instant case, it is sufficient to say that the Court clearly based the order of remand on grounds provided by the statute.* In these circumstances, we have no jurisdiction to review that order and the petition for mandamus must be dismissed."
>
> *(Midland Mortgage Co., supra,* at p. 1344) [emphasis added].

The Court in *Robertson v. Ball,* 534 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1976) reached identical conclusions, and for identical reasons (p. 65):

> "'The court below *expressly stated* that 'this action was improperly removed under Section 1441(b) . . .' because the action was not 'one of which this court would have had original jurisdiction . . .' *We have no occasion to determine whether or not this conclusion of the district court was well-founded. As we read Thermtron, the express invocation by the district court of the § 1447(c) grounds for remand of a removal under § 1441(b) robs this court of any*

*power 'through appeal or otherwise,' to review the merits of the remand order."*

*(Robertson, supra,* at p. 65) [emphasis added].

Finally, the court in *In re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.*, 535 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1976) allowed mandamus to review the District Court's Order of Remand, but only because the District Judge there utilized the doctrine of "judicial estoppel" as the basis for remand, rather than investigating the jurisdictional facts. Plaintiffs there discovered a document in which defendant, Southwestern, in a prior suit, had alleged that it was a Texas corporation rather than a Missouri corporation as it now claimed. The District Judge ruled that this document "estopped" Southwestern from now claiming diversity of citizenship as to the Texas plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals issued the Writ to compel the District Court to "make a suitable inquiry into the question of whether the parties are truly diverse." *(In Re Southwestern Bell, supra,* at p. 861).

In the present case, by contrast, the District Court conducted literally months of inquiry into both the diversity of the parties and the amount in controversy. The court even permitted Defendant Volvo to survey its dealers in California and to submit massive affidavits on the amount in controversy. In short, the District Court here did precisely what the District Court in *In Re Southwestern Bell* did not do.

There are a growing number of such federal decisions to which Defendant can turn if it needs further guidance in interpreting this Court's decision in *Thermtron.*



All of these decisions, as well as Justice Rehnquist's, show that the Court of Appeals properly refused to review Judge Schwarzer's Remand Order because the order was based, *in both form and substance,* upon 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). As the Tenth Circuit stated, referring to this Court's decision in *Thermtron,* "We feel the Court's reasoning is clear . . ." (*Midland Mortgage Co., supra,* at 1344).

---

**III. THIS COURT IN ZAHN v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO., 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973) HAS ALREADY DETERMINED THAT A CLASS ACTION CANNOT BE MAINTAINED WHERE ONLY SOME OF THE CLASS MEMBERS MEET THE JURISDICTIONAL MINIMUM.**

Defendant's Petition for Certiorari, as its final argument, purports to offer a question deserving the attention of the U. S. Supreme Court. The question is whether a "District Court can remand a properly removed class action where some, but not all, members of the class meet the federal jurisdictional requirements." (Petition, p. 12) This question has already been conclusively and affirmatively answered by this Court in *Zahn v. International Paper Co., supra,* and Defendant has provided absolutely no authority and no reason for a different answer. As to the claim that the "lower federal courts have taken differing positions" on this issue, Defendant tries to pass off two cases decided *before Zahn* as in conflict with another decision after *Zahn*![17]

---

[17]Defendant attempted this same ruse before the Court of Appeals, where Defendant cited the *1972* decision of the Ninth Circuit in *City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles,* 451 F.2d

This Court in *Zahn v. International Paper Co.*, 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973) expressly ruled that a class action *cannot* be allowed to proceed in federal court when only *some* of the class members meet the jurisdictional requirement. In *Zahn,* the four named plaintiffs had claims in excess of $10,000, but none of the class members had sufficient claims. The District Court *refused to permit the suit to proceed as a class action and dismissed all the class members,* using language very similar to Judge Schwarzer's here. This court summarized the District Court's ruling as follows:

> "Reading Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969), *as precluding maintenance of the action* by any member of the class whose separate and distinct claim did not individually satisfy the jurisdictional amount and concluding that *it would not be feasible to define a class of property owners each of whom had more than a $10,000 claim, the District Court then refused to permit the suit to proceed as a class action.*"
>
> (*Zahn, supra,* at 414 U.S. 292) (*emphasis added)*

Both the Court of Appeals and this Court affirmed the District Court's decision, and in so doing, this Court stated:

948 (9th Cir. 1972) for the proposition that a class action should not be dismissed where some plaintiffs meet the jurisdictional minimum and some do not. This proposition was expressly rejected by *Zahn* in 1973. Plaintiff also cited *City of Inglewood,* but for a different, and still valid, proposition.



> "None of the plaintiffs in *Snyder v. Harris* alleged a claim exceeding $10,000, but there is no doubt that the rationale of that case controls this one. As previously indicated, *Snyder* invoked the well-established rule that each of several plaintiffs asserting separate and distinct claims must satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement if his claim is to survive a motion to dismiss. This rule plainly mandates not only that there may be no aggregation and that the entire case must be dismissed where none of the plaintiffs claims more than $10,000 but also requires that *any plaintiff without the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed from the case, even though others allege jurisdictionally sufficient claims.*" 414 U.S. at 300 (emphasis supplied). (Emphasis in original)
>
> (*Zahn* at 414 U.S. 300)

This language from *Zahn* is precisely the same language relied on by Judge Schwarzer in his Remand Order. (Order, Appendix to Petition p. 9)

Finally, it should be noted that *Zahn* has also been interpreted to preclude any type of "pendent party jurisdiction", whereby jurisdiction over class members who fail to meet the amount in controversy requirement could be sustained, based on jurisdiction over those members who do meet it. In *Freeman v. Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers, Inc.*, 398 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y., 1975), the District Court for the Southern District of N.Y. reviewed the post-*Zahn* cases pertaining to "pendent party" jurisdiction and stated:

> "We agree with the authorities discussed *supra* that whatever vitality the doctrine of pendent

parties may have in other contexts (*i.e.*, federal or admiralty claims), *Zahn* effectively forecloses the invocation of pendent party or ancillary jurisdiction to sustain federal jurisdiction over a diversity claim not in excess of $10,000."

*(Freeman, supra,* at p. 526)

The Ninth Circuit has, in any event, long rejected the notion of pendent jurisdiction over parties. *(Hymer v. Chai,* 407 F.2d, 136 (9th Cir. 1969); *United Pacific/Reliance Ins. Cas. v. Lewiston,* 372 F.Supp. 700 (D. Idaho 1974).

Both *Zahn* and the cases interpreting it thus confirm that the District Court here properly analyzed the jurisdictional issues in ordering remand of this class action. It has been plaintiff's position throughout this litigation that *Zahn* is dispositive of Defendant's claim to federal jurisdiction. Now, as in the first hearing before the Magistrate in the District Court, Defendant is simply unable to produce any authority contrary to *Zahn* or any reason why *Zahn* should not apply. What defendant has been able to do, with the resources so abundantly available to it, is finance a year of litigation to prevent the prompt application of this Court's settled rule in *Zahn.*

---

**CONCLUSION**

Defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari fails to present any claims deserving the attention of this Court. The District Court's opinion shows beyond any doubt that the court thoroughly considered the jurisdictional issues and based its Remand Order expressly on 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). Having done so, the Court of Appeals was not empowered to review the District Court's decision. This Court's own decision in *Thermtron* fully supports the Court of Appeals' refusal to review the District Court's order. Finally, Defendant has presented virtually no reason for this Court to restate its settled rule in *Zahn,* a rule properly applied by the District Court in this case.

For all of these reasons, Defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Dated, San Francisco, California,
February 14, 1977.

COTCHETT, HUTCHINSON & DYER,
JOSEPH W. COTCHETT,

CARTWRIGHT, SAROYAN,
MARTIN & SUCHERMAN, INC.,
JAY R. MARTIN,
RANDALL D. MORRISON,

BROWN, WRIGHT & KAUFMAN,
HAROLD C. WRIGHT,
*Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest Charlene P. Rosack, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated.*

**(Appendix Follows)**

# APPENDIX

## Appendix

### BRIEFS FILED IN DISTRICT COURT REGARDING JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES

1. Plaintiff's Notice of Motion and Memorandum for Remand, April 26, 1976;
2. Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Remand, May 7, 1976;
3. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remand, May 12, 1976;
4. Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Remand, May 27, 1976;
5. Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remand, June 3, 1976;
6. Plaintiff's Objections to Magistrate's Findings, June 11, 1976;
7. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Objections, August 30, 1976;
8. Defendant's Supplemental Brief and Reply to Plaintiff's Objections, September 7, 1976;
9. Defendant's Supplemental Brief and Affidavits Regarding Amount in Controversy, September 24, 1976;
10. Plaintiff's Reply Regarding Amount in Controversy, October 7, 1976;
11. Defendant's Supplemental Reply Regarding Amount in Controversy, October 12, 1976;
12. Defendant's Request for Reconsideration and Memo Regarding Jurisdiction of District Court to Stay or Modify, October 25, 1976.

In the United States District Court
Northern District of California

---

Case No. 76-742-WWS

---

Before: Honorable William W. Schwarzer, Judge

---

Charlene P. Rosack, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Volvo of America Corporation, Aktiebolaget Volvo, Volvo Western Distributing, Inc., and Does I through L,

Defendants.

---

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
Tuesday, October 26, 1976



Reported by: Shirley Linkerman

*Appearances:*

For the Plaintiffs:

Messrs. Cotchett, Hutchinson & Dyer
Bank of California Building
El Camino Real at Fourth Avenue
San Mateo, California
By: Susan Illston

and

Messrs. Cartwright, Saroyan, Martin & Sucherman, Inc.
160 Sansome Street—Suite 900
San Francisco, California 94104
By: Randall D. Morrison, Esquire

For the Defendants:

Messrs. Paul, Hastings & Janofsky
555 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, California 90071
By: Daniel H. Williams, III, Esquire

*Tuesday, October 26, 1976*

THE CLERK: Civil Case No. 76-742, Charlene Rosack versus Volvo of America.

Counsel, appearances, please.

MR. WILLIAMS: Daniel Williams for Volvo.

THE COURT: You haven't filed any more papers since yesterday, have you?

MR. WILLIAMS: No, I haven't.

THE COURT: What have you filed this morning or today, Reply to Defendants' Request For Reconsideration?

MR. MORRISON: That's right, Your Honor, there's another motion pertaining to the Request For Stay, which I believe counsel has filed.

MS. ILLSTON: Yes, Your Honor, I believe it was filed yesterday.

THE COURT: We have had no shortage of papers.

Let me ask, Mr. Williams, what do you intend to do—I don't mean in this court--what are your plans in this matter? Are you going to file a writ of mandate?

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: When are you going to file it?

Have you had it all done?

MR. WILLIAMS: No, I don't.

THE COURT: I am surprised, you had all weekend.

You know, that is the only way you can get anywhere, if you have any remedy at all. I don't think the Court of Appeals would entertain a writ of mandate.

MR. WILLIAMS: I wonder if the Court of Appeals would entertain if the Court would reconsider the motion?

THE COURT: I am not going to reconsider the motion. We spent a lot of time the first time. I don't have any reason to believe what we have done is not right.

MR. WILLIAMS: I will be prepared to go to the Court of Appeals tomorrow for a writ of mandate.

I can file the writ by the end of the week.



THE COURT: I will give you a 48-hour stay. I would think you people can turn this writ of mandate out in a couple of hours with all the briefing you have done in this. You just need to take what you have done and just put it together in a little different form.

MR. WILLIAMS: I appreciate the Court's confidence in our ability. I will relay that to my secretary, as far as typing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It's going to be short, anyway.

MR. WILLIAMS: I think the request will be.

I would appreciate it if we could get a stay until Monday so I could have the weekend to proofread and work on it. I would like to present a polished document.

THE COURT: I don't think that is appropriate. I will give you a 48 hours stay, I think that is plenty of time to prepare a writ of mandate.

I think that I do that out of an abundance of—I don't know what it is, consideration or kindness. I don't think there is any merit, I don't think you have got any right to review this matter, but I think you ought to have a chance to go to the Court of Appeals, and I think that is enough time.

And it seems to me there isn't anything that hasn't been said already that you are going to say to the Ninth Circuit.

So, let's see. What we will do is we will stay the effective time of this order until the close of business—well, let's say the close of business on Friday, October 29th, that is 4:30, Friday, October 29.

Until that time, we will hold the order up.

And, depending on the state of affairs at that time, that is my disposition now.

I don't think that the plaintiffs will be unduly injured by that, adversely affected.

MS. ILLSTON: Susan Illston appearing for Plaintiff Rosack.

Your Honor, just so the record is clear on that, I would like to voice our opposition to any stay order being entered. We feel there is no merit whatever. The seven-month delay is plenty of delay, plenty of time.

Just so you are clear, we vociferously object to that.

THE COURT: I understand you to object. This order will go into effect on Friday at 4:30 unless there is some kind of an order staying further proceedings.

And I intend to entertain no further motions or appeals or applications of any kind. And it will be remanded as of Friday, October 29 at 4:30 p.m., unless there is some superseding order that is issued in the meantime.

MR. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, so that the record is clear, I have made a request to the Court in writing for certification of various issues pursuant to 180 U.S.C. 1292(b), just so I have a record I have a ruling on that.

THE COURT: Yes, it's on file. And we have given a good deal of thought to that over the weekend and concluded we simply can't certify.

We think the provisions in the statute are clear, and the Supreme Court has made it clear it is not an appealable order, and it falls outside—the way I read the statute and the decisions, it simply says outside



of 180 U.S.C. 1292(b). If there is a way to have the matter reviewed, it's only by of writ of mandate. I don't think a writ of mandate wise when there is a finding by the District Court the matter has been improvidently removed.

That is a matter you can take before the Supreme Court—before the Court of Appeals.

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor, I understand what the Court is saying.

If I might point something out to the Court without belaboring the point, it's not my understanding that the Court ruled that the matter is improvidently removed. I looked up the meaning of improvidently, and I think that means wrongfully or without legal basis. I have a case to cite that. And inasmuch as I think the Court found there were some plaintiffs who could not set forth the requisite amount of jurisdictional—is it my understanding of the Court ruling this was improvidently removed and without jurisdiction?

THE COURT: Well, I think the ruling speaks for itself. I am not going to get into a debate as to what my words meant.

I think that order will have to stand on its own bottom. And you can interpret it any way you see fit.

It certainly is a holding under the statute that the matter does not belong here.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, just so——

THE COURT: For the reasons specified in the statute.

MR. WILLIAMS: I understand that, Your Honor, and I am not trying to argue with the Court.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. WILLIAMS: It is my understanding of the Court's ruling, just so we have a clear record, so I am not faced with assertions by the plaintiffs that the matter was improvidently removed and so found to be by the Court, it is my understanding of the Court's ruling what the Court found was that the vast majority of the plaintiffs could not meet the jurisdictional amount requirement, and for reasons of judicial economy, and for other reasons, had to be sent back to the State Court, even though there were plaintiffs who could meet the jurisdictional amount requirement.

THE COURT: I agree with you we should have a clear record.

I will state for the record the only reasons for removal are those set forth in the statute. Nothing I say here is to be interpreted by anybody as being a modification, qualification, explanation, or any other kind of comment upon my prior order.

That will have to stand or fall on its own bottom.

MR. WILLIAMS: Our request for certification then is denied?

THE COURT: It is denied.

MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that all we have before us?

MR. WILLIAMS: I don't think we have anything further. We got the stay, and the certification has been denied, and the reconsideration has been.

THE COURT: I will say, in any event, it was a very interesting question.



MR. WILLIAMS: We appreciate it.

MR. MORRISON: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. ILLSTON: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

---

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, the undersigned Official Reporter of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 450 Golden Gate, San Francisco, California, do hereby certify:

That the foregoing transcript, Pages No. 1 through 9, inclusive, constitute a true, full and correct transcript of my shorthand notes taken as such Official Reporter of the proceedings hereinbefore entitled, and reduced to typewriting to the best of my ability.

(Signed) Shirley S. Linkerman

Jay R. Martin, Esq.
Randall D. Morrison, Esq.
Cartwright, Saroyan, Martin
& Sucherman, Inc.
160 Sansome Street, Suite 900
San Francisco, California 94104
Telephone: (415) 433-0440
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Charlene P. Rosack

United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

United States District Court—Northern District
of California

Case No. C-76-0742 WWS

Volvo of America Corporation,
Petitioner,

vs.

The Honorable William W. Schwarzer, Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
Respondent.

Charlene P. Rosack, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Volvo of America Corporation, Aktiebolaget Volvo, Volvo Western Distributing, Inc., and Does I through L,
Defendants.

[Filed Nov. 3, 1976]



## MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND REQUEST FOR STAY OF REMAND ORDER.

### INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff submits this memorandum to more fully develop points which were only hastily sketched in the memorandum submitted October 28, 1976. Plaintiff received defendant's petition only a few hours before submitting its own response, and did not have time to prepare a thorough, polished document for the court's review. Plaintiff also regrets that a decision to stay the District Court's order was made within a few hours after defendant's petition was received and before plaintiff's opposition papers could be delivered to the court.

### ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I. *Thermtron* Prevents Review of the District Court's Order by Extraordinary Writ or Otherwise, Since the Court's Order of Remand Was Based On 28 U.S.C. 1447(*c*).

Plaintiff's previous briefs in opposition to the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and to defendant's earlier Request for Reconsideration of the District Court's order contain a full discussion of *Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,* 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976). (See plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Certify Interlocutory Appeal, pp. 2-4; plaintiff's Opposition to Writ of Mandamus, pp. 1-4.) At this point, both plaintiff and

defendant agree that *Thermtron* expressly prohibits review of remand orders based on Section 1447(c). The *Thermtron* court stated:

> *"It is unquestioned in this case and conceded by petitioners that this section prohibits review of all remand orders issued pursuant to §1447(c) whether erroneous or not and whether review is sought by appeal or by extraordinary writ.* This has been the established rule under §1447(d) and its predecessors stretching back to 1887. See, e.g., *In re Pennsylvania Co.,* 137 U.S. 451, 11 S.Ct. 141, 34 L.Ed. 738 (1890); *Ex parte Mathew Addy S.S. Co.,* 256 U.S. 417, 41 S.Ct. 508, 65 L.Ed. 1027 (1921); *Employers Reinsurance Corporation v. Bryant,* 299 U.S. 374, 57 S.Ct. 273, 81 L.Ed. 289 (1937); *United States v. Rice,* 327 U.S. 742, 66 S.Ct. 835, 90 L.Ed. 982 (1946). *If a trial judge purports to remand a case on the ground that it was removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction," his order is not subject to challenge in the Court of Appeals by appeal, by mandamus or otherwise."* (Emphasis added.) *(Thermtron, supra,* at 589.)

Two points now deserve further emphasis. The first is the vast difference between *Thermtron,* where the District Court totally ignored §1447(c), and the present case, where the District Court thoroughly analyzed the jurisdictional issues and based its remand order expressly on §1447(c). The second point is the special care the *Thermtron* court took in limiting its rule and trying to avoid the very interpretation of its decision which defendant offers here.

First of all, it is clear that the Supreme Court in *Thermtron* based its decision that mandamus was



appropriate on the fact that the District Court had remanded the case *solely* on the basis of the court's own "crowded calendar" and without purporting in any way to base its remand on lack of jurisdiction under Section 1447(c). *Indeed, the District Court there expressly conceded in its memorandum opinion that the petitioners had a right to remove the action.* (See *Thermtron, supra,* at 548.) The District Court there incorrectly decided that petitioner's right to removal had to be "balanced against plaintiff's right to a forum of their choice and their right to a speedy decision. . . ." *(Thermtron, supra,* at 547-548.)

These facts in *Thermtron* could not be farther from the facts in the present case, where the District Court entertained over a dozen briefs and seven months of argument on the jurisdictional issues before explicitly finding that jurisdiction was lacking and basing its order of remand on that ground. The court's finding of lack of jurisdiction and the court's reliance on 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) are fully obvious in the following passage from the order:

> *"It thus appears to a legal certainty that this Court does not have jurisdiction of this action.* It is a class action brought on behalf of a class of plaintiffs the vast majority of which do not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement with respect to their separate and distinct claims. Under *Zahn,* all of those plaintiffs would have to be dismissed and, if feasible, a class substantially different from that on whose behalf the action was brought certified. *Accordingly, since the action could not be maintained in this Court on behalf of the class for which it was brought, it*

*must be remanded. 28 U.S.C. §1447(c).* See, *Kinsey v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,* 350 F. Supp. 36 (D.N.D. 1973)." (Emphasis added.) (Order, pp. 6-7.)

In the hearing which followed Judge Schwarzer's remand order, defendant's counsel tried to lure the court into saying that its order was based upon "reasons of judicial economy" rather than upon "improvident removal" and "lack of jurisdiction". (See statements made by Mr. Williams, defense counsel, at pp. 6-7 of the Reporter's Transcript of Hearing, Exhibit B hereto.) In so doing, defense counsel was obviously trying to entice the court into stating that its order was based upon something other than §1447(c). Defense counsel hoped to then suggest to the Ninth Circuit that the District Court had "gone outside the statute" and relied upon "reasons of economy" or some other reasons, which would make this case appear similar to *Thermtron.*

Defendant's attempt to extract from Judge Schwarzer some such interpretation of his order was completely unsuccessful. The court clearly stated that the case had been "improvidently removed" (R.T. 6: 23-25) and that the court's order is "a holding under the statute that the matter does not belong here" (R.T. 7:20-21). The court thus refused to accept defendant's bait to reinterpret its own order, and the court stated flatly:

> "I will state for the record the only reasons for removal are those set forth in the statute. Nothing I say here is to be interpreted by any-



> body as being a modification, qualification, explanation, or any other kind of comment upon my prior order."

Both the order and the court's statements leave no doubt that remand *was* based upon the statute, 28 U.S.C. 1447(c).

Finally, it should be noted that the Supreme Court in *Thermtron* was aware that its decision offered a temptation to all those seeking an excuse for a review of orders of remand. The Court was therefore careful to limit its ruling. For example, the Court noted that the District Court and the Court of Appeals there had not even suggested that the "case was not removable under Section 1441 or that it had been improvidently removed from the state court for want of jurisdiction or otherwise." *(Thermtron, supra,* at 551.) Plainly, it would have made a crucial difference if the District Court there, like the Court here, found the case improvidently removed for lack of jurisdiction. The *Thermtron* court later stated:

> "In so holding we neither disturb nor take issue with the well-established general rule that §1447 (d) and its predecessors were intended to forbid review by appeal or extraordinary writ of any order remanding a case on the grounds permitted by the statute." *(Thermtron, supra,* at 554.)

Every bit of the court's language in *Thermtron* demonstrates that it was not intended to allow wholesale review of remand orders where the District Court, as in the present case, has given long and thorough

consideration to the jurisdictional questions and remanded the case expressly on that basis.

## II. Defendant's Assertion That the Court Went "Outside the Statute" In Ordering Remand Is Based On Verbal Confusion and Logical Error.

The record of hearings, the briefs, the Court's order of remand, and the transcript of the hearing all demonstrate that the order was founded upon 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). The only reason defendants are tempted to argue otherwise is their own confusion of terms. Essentially, defendant's argument is this: the court found jurisdiction over some plaintiffs (defendants say "several", while the Court said "a few"). Defendants then assert that, since the Court *"found jurisdiction"* in some sense, the Court must have gone outside the statute to order remand. The error should be obvious. *Even if the Court did find jurisdiction over a few plaintiffs, this finding is not equivalent to finding "jurisdiction" per se or finding jurisdiction over the class action which was before the Court.* In fact, the Court expressly ruled that it *did not* have *jurisdiction of the action.* (Court's Order, 6:19-20.) In so doing, the Court based its remand order on the very grounds specified in the statute and did not go "outside the statute".

Defendant's whole argument thus rests upon the mistaken belief that finding jurisdiction over a few plaintiffs, if any, is coextensive with finding jurisdiction over the action. This error is obvious in several passages in defendant's brief (see, for example, 11:



26-28, 14:19-25). It is only by leaving out the Court's crucial finding of *no jurisdiction* that defendant can then leap to the conclusion that the Court relied on "extraneous factors" beyond the statute, as in the following passage from defendant's brief:

> "The sole ground for the respondent's remand order was that a majority of the purported class plaintiffs would not have claims in excess of $10,000. However, 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) does not authorize such a ground for an order of remand. *In essence, the respondent has allowed extraneous factors, such as expedition of the Rule 23 class action, to defeat federal jurisdiction which had properly attached upon removal."* (Emphasis added.) (Defendant's Petition for Writ of Mandamus, 14:19-25.)

Defendant here ignores the fact that the Court found jurisdiction lacking and that 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) *does* authorize remand on that basis. Defendant's argument really amounts to saying that any time a court issues a remand order which defendant thinks "is wrong" under the statute, this means the court must have "gone outside the statute". Such an argument is totally fallacious and is nothing more than verbal hijinks.

## III. The District Court Correctly Remanded a Class Action Where All, Or Nearly All, the Class Members Did Not Meet the Jurisdictional Minimum, Where the Named Plaintiff Herself Did Not Meet the Jurisdictional Minimum, and Where It Would Be Pure Speculation To Say

Whether Any Plaintiffs Could Be Found To Meet the Jurisdictional Minimum.

The Court's order shows that *Zahn v. International Paper Co.*, 414 U.S. 291 (1973), requires that each plaintiff satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement in a class action where, as here, the individual plaintiffs' claims are separate and distinct. *Zahn* also requires that ". . . any plaintiff without the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed from the case, even though others allege jurisdictionally sufficient claims." (414 U.S., at 300, cited at page 4, Court's Order.) In *Zahn,* the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's *refusal to allow the case to proceed as a class action after the District Court had concluded that "It would not be feasible to define a class of property owners each of whom have more than a $10,000 claim. . . ."* (Emphasis added.) *(Zahn, supra,* at 507.) The Supreme Court in *Zahn* thus *affirmed dismissal of the class action, by affirming dismissal of all the class members* when they failed to meet the jurisdictional minimum. The only plaintiffs who were not dismissed were the four named plaintiffs, each of whom had a claim in excess of the jurisdictional amount.

It is obvious from *Zahn* that a court *cannot maintain jurisdiction over an entire class action where only a few of the plaintiffs* (there, the named plaintiffs) meet the jurisdictional minimum. If this is what defendant suggests in the present case, defendant's argument is completely contrary to *Zahn,* where the court expressly dismissed all the other class members. Indeed, the argument for dismissal in the present case is even stronger than in *Zahn,* because here *not even the named plaintiff has a claim which meets the jurisdictional minimum.* Ms. Rosack would herself have to be dismissed from this action, because she purchased only one Volvo automobile and could not possibly have a claim in excess of $10,000 for price-fixing on that single automobile. Ms. Rosack is not one of the "multiple purchasers" upon whom defendant hoped to rest jurisdiction here.[1] Since the named plaintiff here does not meet the jurisdictional minimum and would have to be dismissed along with the other class members, defendant can take no comfort from the possibility[2] that the named plaintiffs in *Zahn* might have been allowed to continue the suit individually.



[1]Defendant offered the "multiple purchaser" theory to the District Court by submitting affidavits purportedly showing some 28 multiple purchasers of Volvos, each of whom was supposed to have a damage claim in excess of $10,000 when the price-fixing damages per car were added to treble damages and to that plaintiff's portion of the anticipated attorneys' fees. Nearly every one of these purported purchasers, however, turned out to be a leasing company, which in California is considered an automobile "dealer" rather than a "retail purchaser" as required by plaintiff's complaint. Hence, the court could find, at most, that only "a few" purchasers met the jurisdictional minimum (Court's Order, pp. 6-7).

[2]In *Zahn* the named plaintiffs *commenced* the action in federal court and met the jurisdictional minimum. The present case is a *removed action* where the named plaintiff *does not* meet the minimum and would *not* want to continue individually.

Defendant's bootstrap argument regarding this named plaintiff is completely frivolous. Defendant states that "[t]he court never specifically found that the named plaintiff, Charlene Rosack, did not have a claim in excess of $10,000," but the *very passage* defendant quotes shows that the Court knew she *did not* have such a claim and *could not* have one *unless* all the attorneys' fees were assigned to her, a move the Court had just rejected.

The fact that the named plaintiff here fails to meet the jurisdictional minimum has also been held sufficient basis *to dismiss the entire class action. (Kinsey v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,* 359 F.Supp. 36 (D.N.D. 1973).) In *Kinsey,* the court reviewed numerous cases where the named plaintiff did not have a damage claim in excess of $10,000 but other class members purportedly did have such claims. After examining these cases, including the Ninth Circuit decision in *City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles,* 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972), the court concluded:

> "The above cases illustrate that if the representative plaintiff cannot meet the jurisdictional requirement, the class action must be dismissed, unless he falls within a situation where aggregation is permissible." *(Kinsey, supra,* at 40.)

*Kinsey* thus allows *complete dismissal* of the entire class action and eliminates defendant's claim that the Court could retain jurisdiction based on a few class members who might qualify.

*Kinsey* cuts the last thread upon which defendant has tried to hang jurisdiction—the mere possibility that somewhere, somehow, a few class members might be found who have claims in excess of $10,000, even though the named plaintiff and the overwhelming majority of the 50,000 class members do not. In its order, the Court stated that, even viewing the record *most favorably to defendants,* only "a few" members of the class estimated at 50,000 could meet the jurisdictional minimum. (Court's Order, 6:1-4.) It would have been pure speculation for the Court to retain jurisdiction in the hope that some such individuals



would later step forward. In any event, the Court had no choice but to remand the action since *Zahn* required dismissal of the named plaintiff and nearly all the class members, and *Kinsey* required dismissal of the entire class action.

## IV. Regardless Of Whether Defendant Thinks the District Court's Order Erroneous, the Order *Was* Based Upon 28 U.S.C. §1447 and Is Not Reviewable. There Was No "Abuse Of Discretion".

The Supreme Court in *Thermtron* stated:

> "It is unquestioned in this case and conceded by petitioners that this section prohibits review of all remand orders issued pursuant to §1447(c) *whether erroneous or not, and whether review is sought by appeal or by extraordinary writ."* (Emphasis added.) *(Thermtron, supra,* at 549.)

The absolute maximum that defendant could possibly claim here is that the Court's Order of Remand, based upon *Zahn,* was erroneous. Any suggestion that the Court's order was based upon something else is patently false. Even if the Court *had* erred, which plaintiff absolutely denies, the Supreme Court's own language in *Thermtron* still requires rejection of defendant's request for mandamus here. The court in *Thermtron* stated flatly that "error" was not enough.

Other courts have explicitly required that the party seeking mandamus show "abuse of discretion". For example, in *Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,* 55 F.2d 612 (1975), the court stated:

> "The traditional use of the writ [of mandamus] in aid of appellate jurisdiction has been to confine

a lower court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction. Thus, '[t]he writ is appropriate issued . . . when there is a "usurpation of judicial power" or a clear abuse of discretion.' *Schlagenhauf v. Holder,* 379 U.S. 104, 110, 85 S.Ct. 234, 238, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1974); *River Valley, Inc. v. Dubuque Cty.,* 507 F.2d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 1974). However, mandamus is not to be used when the most that can be claimed is that the district judge may have erred in ruling on a question clearly within his jurisdiction. *Will v. United States,* 389 U.S. 90, 104, 88 S.Ct. 269, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967)." *(Pfizer, supra,* at 614.)

The *Pfizer* court also noted that the mere fact that the court allegedly erred on "jurisdictional questions" does not amount to a usurpation of power making mandamus appropriate. The court stated:

"It is true that this petition . . . challenges what can fairly be called a jurisdictional ruling. But that difference alone is not enough to make a peremptory writ appropriate . . . *The challenged assumption or denial of jurisdiction must be so plainly wrong as to indicate failure to comprehend or refusal to be guided by unambiguous provisions of a statute or settled common law doctrine. If a rational and substantial legal argument can be made in support of the questioned jurisdictional ruling, the case is not appropriate for mandamus."* (Emphasis added.) *(Pfizer, supra,* at 615.)

Given these well-established rules, there is absolutely no basis for defendant's claim here that a writ of mandamus issue. Even given the benefit of every doubt, the most defendant can claim here is error, not



abuse of discretion. For this reason, as well as the fact that the Court based its remand order expressly on §1447(c), no review is permitted by mandamus or otherwise.

## CONCLUSION

The District Court here thoroughly considered every jurisdictional issue and remanded the case after it found jurisdiction lacking. The Court relied expressly on §1447(c) in its Order of Remand. The Court's order is therefore final and non-reviewable under *Thermtron.* The District Court also correctly ruled on the jurisdictional questions, finding *Zahn* dispositive. Defendant has no credible argument to the contrary and has simply invented another challenge to further delay remand to the State Court which should have jurisdiction here.

Dated: November 3, 1976.

Cartwright, Saroyan, Martin
& Sucherman, Inc.
/s/ Randall D. Morrison
Randall D. Morrison
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I, Jennifer Werner, declare under penalty of perjury:

That I am a citizen of the U.S.A., over the age of 18 years and not a party to or interested in the within entitled cause; that I am an employee of Cartwright, Saroyan, Martin & Sucherman, Inc., and my business address is 160 Sansome Street, Suite 900, San Francisco, California 94104.

That I served by mail the following document:

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND REQUEST FOR STAY OF REMAND ORDER

in the following manner:

I enclosed a true copy of said document in an envelope, addressed as follows:

Robert S. Span, Esq.
Paul, Hastings & Janofsky
Twenty-Second Floor
555 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, CA 90071

Brown, Wright & Kaufman
2500 El Camino Real, Suite 411
Palo Alto, CA 94306

Joseph W. Cotchett, Esq.
Susan Illston, Esq.
Cotchett, Hutchinson & Dyer
Bank of California Building
El Camino Real at Fourth Avenue
San Mateo, CA 94402

I sealed said envelope and deposited it so sealed and addressed on the 3rd day of November, 1976, with the said document enclosed therein and with the postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States Post Office, in the City and County of San Francisco, State of California.

Executed on November 3, 1976, in San Francisco, California.

/s/ Jennifer Werner
Jennifer Werner



Jay R. Martin, Esq.
Randall D. Morrison, Esq.
Cartwright, Saroyan, Martin
& Sucherman, Inc.
160 Sansome Street, Suite 900
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: (415) 433-0440
Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States District Court
Northern District of California

No. C-76-742 OJC

Charlene P. Rosack, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Volvo of America Corporation, Aktiebolaget Volvo, Volvo Western Distributing, Inc., and Does I through L,
Defendants.

## SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND

[Filed Oct. 7, 1976]

### INTRODUCTION

In the previous hearing, plaintiff established that defendant's theory of aggregating attorney's fees to satisfy the amount in controversy was untenable. This

theory was a last minute attempt to create federal jurisdiction when it was otherwise lacking. The same is true for defendant's present attempt to conjure up plaintiffs whose damage claims would exceed $10,000.00. Instead of showing a credible number of such plaintiffs and a reasonable liklihood that they could meet the $10,000.00 minimum, defendants' efforts have produced a grand total of *two retail purchasers* of Volvo automobiles, required by plaintiff's complaint, and even these two purchasers do not have claims in excess of $10,000.00. Defendants' affidavits therefore fail to show that *any* of the class plaintiffs here can satisfy the amount required for federal jurisdiction.

## ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

### I

Nearly all of the Volvo purchasers listed in defendants' affidavits are *auto leasing companies* which are *"dealers"* under California law and not retail purchasers as required by plaintiff's complaint

Paragraph III of plaintiff's first cause of action states:

> "Plaintiff, Charlene P. Rosack, brings this action on behalf of herself and all other persons, natural or legal, who purchased a new Volvo automobile *at retail* from a Volvo dealer located in the State of California during the period in controversy."

Nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff purport to represent *wholesale* purchasers of any sort—whether leasing companies, discount houses or other non-retail



purchasers. Yet, these are precisely the types of purchasers defendant offers here.

Of the 28 auto purchasers listed in defendants' 9 affidavits, the overwhelming majority are auto leasing companies, which under California law are considered auto "dealers". Vehicle Code §285 defines a dealer as follows:

> "'Dealer' is a person not otherwise expressly excluded by Section 286 who:
>
> "(a) For commission, money, or other thing of value, sells, exchanges, buys or offers for sale, negotiates or attempts to negotiate, a sale or exchange of an interest in, a vehicle subject to registration under this code, or induces or attempts to induce any person to *buy or exchange an interest in* a vehicle and, who receives or expects to receive a commission, money, brokerage fees, profit, or any other thing of value, from either the seller or purchaser of said vehicle, or
>
> "(b) Is engaged wholly or in part in the business of selling vehicles or buying or taking in trade, vehicles for the purpose of resale, selling, or offering for sale, or consigned to be sold, or otherwise dealing in vehicles, whether or not such vehicles are owned by such person."

This provision has been interpreted in a recent and thorough California Attorney General's opinion which expressly considered the question *whether automobile leasing companies are dealers under California law.* The opinion focused on the language, "a sale or exchange of an interest in . . ." in Vehicle Code §285, and concluded that leasing companies *were* dealers:

"The Legislature . . . expressly provided that a dealer is a person who 'negotiates or attempts to negotiate, a sale or exchange *of an interest* in, a vehicle . . .' (§285) (emphasis added) and thus broadened that which a person must 'sell' in order to qualify as a 'dealer' to include not only title, which is what a sale is commonly construed to convey, but an 'interest' which is generally viewed as something less than title or full ownership. . . ."

"By defining a dealer to be a person who negotiates or attempts to negotiate a sale or exchange of an 'interest' in a vehicle, therefore, the Legislature has indicated by the very language they choose (sic) to utilize that a dealer can be a person who not only 'sells' a vehicle, and thus transfers title as well as possession for consideration, *but also a person who 'sells' an interest in a vehicle, that is, one who transfers something less than title for consideration, thus creating what amounts to a bailment or a lease of the motor vehicle.*" (emphasis added)

The opinion goes on to conclude,

"Thus, it is our opinion that the Legislature intended leasing companies to be "dealers" under section 285. This interpretation is reinforced by section 285(b) which states that a dealer is a person who 'is engaged wholly or in part in the business of selling vehicles or buying or taking in trade, . . . *or otherwise dealing in vehicles*' (emphasis added), that is one who otherwise "traffics, transacts business or trades" in vehicles." (57 Opn. CA Atty General 561 [1974].

Since auto leasing companies in California are "dealers", they are obviously not "retail purchasers"



and do not fit the description of the class members given in plaintiff's complaint. The court can, of course, take judicial notice of the commonly known fact that leasing companies do not pay the "retail" price or the cars they purchase. This analysis eliminates 23 out of 27 buyers listed by defendant. (Twenty-one of the purchasers are leasing companies by name and two others are leasing divisions of banks, Wells Fargo and Security Pacific Bank, listed in defendant's Exhibit "E", Page -2-). Of the remaining five (5) parties, two (2) are not purchasers at all, but lessees of Volvos (National University of San Diego and D.L. Glaze Company of San Francisco). A third alleged purchaser, Nationwide Auto Sales (defendant's Exhibit "E", Page -1-) is obviously a dealer, but plaintiffs were unable to verify its status since there was no answer at the number listed for it in Los Angeles. This leaves a total of two (2) "retail purchasers" of Volvo automobiles. (See Morrison Affidavit attached hereto.)

## II

The federal court would not have jurisdiction over either of these two purchasers, because their damage claims would not exceed $10,000.00

The damages to be considered for jurisdiction purposes are those alleged by plaintiffs in good faith. As the court stated in *Beckerman v. Sands,* 384 F.Supp. 1296 (S.D.N.Y., 1974):

"Defendants dispute the amount of provable actual damages, but because there is no indication that the [plaintiffs'] allegation is made in

bad faith, we accept arguendo plaintiffs' computation as a proper basis on which to calculate the jurisdictional amount." (*Beckerman, supra,* at 1299)

Defendant, Volvo, after denying that there are any damages in their Answer to plaintiff's Complaint, have now submitted *gross* profit margins, based on suggested retail prices and then argues therefrom that the damages per class member create federal jurisdiction.

The fallacy of defendant's presentation can be clearly outlined as follows:

1. *Gross* profit figures for the highest sticker price are given.

2. No evidence of average *net* profit of Volvo dealers is given.

3. No breakdown of expenses which must be deducted from *gross* profits to arrive at a reasonable *net* profit is provided.

It is submitted that Volvo dealers in business to make money cannot consistently discount auto prices below their break even point. To determine this break even point, and the margin available to them for reducing their prices, one must know their *net* profit figure. The *gross* profit (sales prices less cost of auto) is a meaningless figure.

As set out in the Affidavit of Harold Wright, from *gross* profit must be deducted dealer's preparation and shipping charges, salesman's commissions (four and one-half percent [4½%] of sale price for Northern



California union members) rent, advertising, salaries and all of the rest of the costs attendant to operating any business.

Volvo has compounded their deception to the court, by providing it with maximum gross profit figures. Attached as Exhibit "A" is Volvo's "Dealer Average Gross Profit Objective On New Volvo Retail Sales" prepared by Volvo setting out far more realistic figures as to what the alleged true *gross* profit Volvo dealers strive for. For the year 1974, the difference between gross profit figures as presented to the court by defendant in his Affidavit (defendant's Exhibit "G") and that expected by Volvo (Exhibit "A") is up to $800.00 per auto. Based on the foregoing with a true average gross profit for the period 1969 to 1974 of approximately $675.00 per auto and then deducting the foregoing expenses to arrive at a *net* profit, it is respectfully submitted that a reasonable estimate of damages for the price fixing alleged herein would be $100.00 to $200.00 per auto.

Plaintiff, of course, offers these estimates strictly for the purpose of providing a reasonable measure of damages in determining the amount in controversy. Plaintiff obviously cannot, at this point, stipulate to these or any other figures as binding on the ultimate damages to be proven in the case. It is ridiculous for defendants to suggest that Plaintiff make such a stipulation at this point.

Using plaintiff's figures, (as the rule stated in *Beckerman, supra,* requires,) even the two (2) purchasers remaining in defendants' list would not meet

the $10,000.00 jurisdictional minimum. The buyer with twelve (12) cars, at approximately $200.00 damages per car, would have $2,400.00 in damages, which when trebled would amount of $7,200.00. With the reasonable attorney's fee of twenty-five percent (25%), the total would only reach $9,000.00. The other buyer, with ten (10) cars, would be far short of the $10,000.00 mark. The fact is, that only two (2) of the purchasers listed by defendant even fit the description of plaintiffs' class members and these two (2) fail to meet the minimum required for federal jurisdiction. Defendant's Affidavits do not even begin to provide information upon which a court could rely in finding federal jurisdiction. The court is required to determine *to a legal certainty* that the asserted claims reach the minimum, and if the court believes the amount is "really less" than that claimed, it must deny jurisdiction. (*Kavit v. A. C. Stamm & Co.* [1974, 2nd Cir] 491 F.2d 1179.)

III

Defendant has been unable to produce *any* qualified class members with claims in excess of $10,000.00, assuming even if defendant were able to locate a few such persons, *Zahn v. International Paper Company* would prevent the court from exercising jurisdiction over the class and would require dismissal of virtually all the other class members.

*Zahn v. International Paper Company,* 414 U.S. 291; 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973) has haunted defendants since the first arguments on remand and is still the case which should finally be dispositive. In *Zahn,* the



United States Supreme Court considered class action claims by plaintiff owners of lakefront property which had allegedly been polluted by the defendant paper company. The suit was brought as a diversity action, and the District Court found that only the named plaintiffs satisfied the $10,000.00 jurisdictional requirement. The District Court was convinced "to a legal certainty" that the other class members *did not* have claims in excess of $10,000.00. The Supreme Court summarized the District Court's conclusions as follows:

> "Reading *Snyder v. Harris,* 394 U.S. 332, 89 S. Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969), as precluding maintenance of the action by any member of the class whose separate and distinct claim did not individually satisfy the jurisdic ional amount and *concluding that it would not be feasible to define a class of property owners each of whom had more than a $10,000.00 claim, the District Court then refused to permit the suit to proceed as a class action."*
>
> (*Zahn, supra,* at 507) (Emphasis Added)

The Supreme Court then affirmed the District Court's judgment in its entirety, stating:

> "As previously indicated, *Snyder* invoked the well-established rule that each of several plaintiffs asserting separate and distinct claims must satisfy the jurisdictional-amount requirement if his claim is to survive a motion to dismiss. This rule plainly mandates not only that there may be no aggregation and that the entire case must be dismissed where none of the plaintiffs claims more than $10,000 but also requires that any plaintiff

without the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed from the case, even though others allege jurisdictionally sufficient claims."

In *Zahn,* dismissal was necessary because it was the plaintiffs who had alleged federal jurisdiction and who failed to show that the class members met the jurisdictional minimum. In the present case, however, plaintiffs have always maintained that Federal Court does not have jurisdiction, and that the court should therefore remand the case to State Court, which would have jurisdiction over the class members. Here, there is no need to go through further motions in attempting to certify the class, only to have the court then dismiss the class action for lack of jurisdiction. Instead, the court should remand the case to State Court, which will have jurisdiction. As a practical matter, however, it will not even be necessary for the court to rely on Zahn, because defendants *have completely failed to show that any of the class members* here will have claims over $10,000.00. Zahn would only be important only if defendants *had been* able to find a few plaintiffs who did qualify.

## CONCLUSION

Defendant has offered its final, novel theory for creating federal jurisdiction in this case. This theory fails, because twenty-six (26) out of twenty-eight (28) of the named parties do not fit the description of retail purchasers required for plaintiffs' class, and even the two (2) which remain fail to meet the jurisdictional minimum. The fact is, that despite a



great deal of ingenuity on the part of defendants' counsel, there is simply no factual or legal basis for satisfying the amount in controversy requirement in this case. Even if defendants were able to conjure up a few plaintiffs who met both the class description and the jurisdictional minimum, the class action would ultimately have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It is plainly time for this case to be returned to the State Court which does have jurisdiction over the class plaintiff has pled in her Complaint.

Dated: October 7, 1976.

Respectfully submitted,
Cartwright, Saroyan, Martin
& Sucherman, Inc.
/s/ Jay R. Martin
Jay R. Martin
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

AFFIDAVIT OF RANDALL D. MORRISON

State of California

County of San Francisco—ss:

I, RANDALL D. MORRISON, say:

1. I am one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs herein.

2. That I conducted an investigation by telephone inquiry to verify the status of the Volvo purchasers listed in defendant's Affidavits.

3. Twenty-one (21) of the twenty-eight (28) purchasers listed are identified by name as automobile leasing companies.

4. Two (2) of the alleged purchasers were not identified as auto lessors, but were in fact leasing divisions of banks:

a. Wells Fargo Bank of San Diego;

b. Security Pacific Bank.

(Both listed in defendant's Exhibit "D")



5. In addition to confirming the status of Security Pacific Bank, above, as an auto lessor, Mr. Robert Sproule of Security Pacific Bank, explained that only a few of the cars acquired by the Bank for leasing were ever *purchased*. Nearly all these automobiles, well over one hundred, were never purchased at all, but were in fact, *leased directly by the Volvo dealer to the customer, with the lease subsequently assigned by the dealer to the Bank.* Mr. Sproule stated that Security Pacific, Wells Fargo and numerous other banks had similar leasing arrangements with dozens of Volvo dealers.

6. Nationwide Auto Sales listed in defendant's Exhibit "E", is by name an auto dealer, but I was unable to verify its status because there was no answer at the number listed for this company in Los Angeles.

7. Two (2) of the alleged purchasers listed in defendant's Affidavits are, according to information from their employees, *lessees* of automobiles not purchasers. These are:

a. D. L. Glaze Company of San Francisco, (defendant's Exhibit "H")

b. National University of San Diego, (defendant's Exhibit "D")

8. Two (2) of the purchasers listed in defendant's Affidavits are actual, *retail purchasers* of Volvo automobiles:

a. First Federal Savings & Loan of Santa Monica, twelve (12) cars (defendant's Exhibit "A")

b. Prestige Optics of San Francisco, ten (10) cars (defendant's Exhibit "H")

The above facts are true and correct to the best of my information and knowledge.

Dated: October 7, 1976.

/s/ Randall D. Morrison
Randall D. Morrison

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 7th day of October, 1976.

/s/ Linda M. Caputa
Linda M. Caputa, Notary Public in and for said State and County.

(Seal)

Linda M. Coputa
Notary Public—California
City and County of San Francisco
My Commission Expires June 7, 1980



Exhibit A

| | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annex Motors | $550 | $460 | $500 | $675 | $700 | $ 850 |
| Autocar Europe | • | 500 | 481 | 725 | • | • |
| Daly City Datsun-Volvo | • | • | 550 | • | • | • |
| Dewey Eastman | 550 | 575 | • | 675 | • | • |
| Hanford Motors | • | 500 | • | • | • | • |
| Ken Keegan Imported Cars | 550 | 500 | 500 | 675 | 650 | 800 |
| Ken Keegan Volvo | • | • | • | • | 650 | 800 |
| Kendall Motor Co. | • | 475 | 500 | • | • | • |
| Park Motors | • | 600 | • | • | • | • |
| Peninsula European | • | 450 | 475 | 675 | 650 | 850 |
| Premier Volvo | 550 | 475 | 475 | • | • | 900 |
| Royal Motor Sales | 550 | 480 | 500 | 675 | 750 | 900 |
| Royal Volvo | • | 500 | 550 | 675 | 650 | 800 |
| Scandia Motors | • | 450 | 550 | 675 | 750 | 850 |
| Ed Barwick Plymouth | • | 400 | 530 | 675 | • | 800 |
| Carlson Motors | 550 | 480 | 530 | • | • | • |
| Ray Cokeley Motors | 550 | 400 | 600 | 675 | 750 | 1000 |
| Continental Volvo | 550 | 500 | 550 | 675 | 750 | 850 |
| Hayward Auto Imports | 550 | 480 | 500 | 675 | 750 | 914 |
| John's Motor Sales | • | 500 | 530 | • | 750 | • |
| Lester G. Lawrence | • | 550 | 550 | 675 | 750 | 900 |
| H. W. McKevitt Co. | 550 | 500 | 550 | 675 | 750 | 900 |
| Walt Martin Motors | 550 | 500 | 530 | • | • | • |
| Ogden Imports | • | 500 | 530 | 675 | 600 | 800 |
| Pierotti Motors | 550 | 450 | 530 | 675 | 750 | 850 |
| Torvick Sales Company | 550 | 400 | 550 | 675 | • | 900 |
| Turner Motors | • | 550 | 600 | • | 750 | 950 |
| Winter Motors Company | • | 600 | 600 | • | 750 | 900 |

**DEALER AVERAGE GROSS PROFIT OBJECTIVE ON NEW VOLVO RETAIL SALES**

•Information not available.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I, LINDA M. CAPUTA, declare under penalty of perjury:

That I am a citizen of the U.S.A., over the age of 18 years and not a party to or interested in the within entitled cause; that I am an employee of Cartwright, Saroyan, Martin & Sucherman, Inc., and my business address is 160 Sansome Street, Suite 900, San Francisco, California 94104.

That I served by mail the following document:

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND

in the following manner:

I enclosed a true copy of said document in an envelope, addressed as follows:

PAUL, HASTINGS & JANOFSKY
DANIEL H. WILLIAMS, III, ESQ.
ROBERT S. SPAN, ESQ.
555 South Flower Street, 22nd Fl.
Los Angeles, California 90071

I sealed said envelope and deposited it so sealed and addressed on the 7th day of October, 1976, with the said document enclosed therein and with the postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States Post Office, in the City and County of San Francisco, State of California.

Executed on October 7, 1976, in San Francisco, California.

/s/ Linda M. Caputa
Linda M. Caputa